Cursor agent
- Category
- Coding agent
- Type
- Coding agent from Anysphere inside the Cursor editor (agent mode), as background or cloud agents that open pull requests, and as a command-line agent; proprietary; runs models chosen by the user or by Cursor (including Cursor's own Composer models)
- Source
- Product documentation
- Last reviewed
- 2026-10-19 (what this means)
Citation check incomplete — recheck later.
Summary
Cursor's agent works inside the Cursor editor, as cloud agents that open pull requests, and from the command line. Nineteen independent sources were counted (ten peer-reviewed). Fourteen are field studies of public GitHub pull requests from 2025, mostly drawn from one dataset (AIDev): Cursor acceptance was usually second or third of five agents (about 64-77%), lower for performance fixes (42%), and CI runs on its pull requests failed more often than for Copilot or Codex. In benchmarks, Cursor v2.3 tied the highest result on an iOS benchmark (12%) and Cursor Agent ranked first on one GPU-kernel task set. Security tests found prompt-injection and misuse exposure, reduced in newer versions. 28 CVEs (2025-2026) concern agent features; fixes are listed. Informational only; not a guarantee, endorsement, or certification.
Overall score: 57 · Evidence grade: A · Independent sources: 19 performance (10 peer-reviewed), 17 other
Evidence grade describes the amount and type of evidence, not the agent's quality.
Grade note: Grade A: 19 counted sources (10 peer-reviewed), including versioned tests within 12 months (Cursor v3.3.30 in an ISSTA 2026 study; Cursor v2.3 in a KDD 2026 benchmark). Fourteen counted sources are field studies largely drawn from one dataset (AIDev, 2025), so they are not independent samples. (see methodology)
Factor breakdown
| Factor | Weight | Score | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Completion rate | 30% | Pull-request field studies (2025): Cursor acceptance 74.5% (74.4% in the common window, second to Codex 79.9%), 74.6%, 76.47% for security work, 68.4% for fixes, 65.22%, 63.9% estimated, 0.67 average, 51.4%, and 42% for performance fixes; CI runs on its pull requests succeeded 65-73% (Copilot and Codex about 93%). Benchmarks: SWE-Bench Mobile 12% with Cursor v2.3 (tied highest of 22 configurations; low in absolute terms); AgentKernelArena first on Triton-to-Triton with Opus 4.7. Results depend strongly on the model chosen. | |
| Disputes | 20% | 28 CVEs (2025-2026) concern agent features, CVSS 4.4-9.8 (four at 9.6 or above, including 2026 sandbox escapes); all were published by Cursor through GitHub advisories with fixed versions. In July 2025 Cursor apologised for a June 2025 pricing change and offered refunds. No filed legal or regulatory action specific to the agent was found. | |
| Adherence to limits | 25% | Security tests: malicious issue requests succeeded in 66.5% of runs in auto-run mode (41.1% with Sonnet 4.6); Cursor IDE completed 39.19% of attack-technique misuse requests (Cursor CLI 62.16%); tool-hijacking reached code execution on older releases but at most 0.3 on v3.3.30. Several CVEs are allowlist, sensitive-file or sandbox bypasses, since fixed. One reported incident (2026) of a destructive database deletion. Field data show low security-smell rates in two studies and near-average in another. | |
| Evidence quality | 25% | Nineteen independent sources, ten peer-reviewed (seven MSR 2026 papers, Information and Software Technology, ISSTA 2026, KDD 2026), with versioned tests within 12 months. Fourteen are field studies largely from one dataset (AIDev, 2025), so they are correlated; benchmarks are few and model-dependent. Grade A. |
0.30 × 55 + 0.20 × 45 + 0.25 × 40 + 0.25 × 85 = 56.75, rounded to 57 (rounding rule).
Scope
Cursor's agent features from January 2025: agent mode in the editor, background and cloud agents (pull requests on cursor/ branches), and the Cursor CLI agent. Tab completion, inline edits (Cmd-K), chat-only use, Bugbot code review, the 2024 Composer before agent mode, and whole-product adoption studies are not covered. Results depend heavily on the language model chosen and on the task.
How sources were counted
Anysphere material (blog posts, documentation, CursorBench and the Composer 2 Technical Report) is not counted. Pull-request field studies of Cursor's background and cloud agents count; fourteen of the counted sources are field studies drawn largely from one shared dataset (AIDev, 2025), so they are not independent samples, and, as for the other coding-agent entries, each study counts once. Comparisons written by authors from a competing product's company that include that product are listed but not counted. Studies of Tab completion, of models in a Cursor-like harness, or of whole-product adoption are not evidence about this entry.
Security and disputes
The agent can edit files and run terminal commands, with an optional auto-run mode. 28 CVEs published in 2025 and 2026 concern its agent features (MCP configuration, the auto-run allowlist, sensitive-file protection, the terminal sandbox, the CLI and the cloud agent), with CVSS scores from 4.4 to 9.8; Cursor published each through its GitHub security advisories with a fixed version. In July 2025 Cursor apologised for a June 2025 pricing change and offered refunds for unexpected charges. One self-reported incident (April 2026) describes a Cursor agent deleting a production database volume. No filed legal or regulatory action specific to the agent was found.
Uncertainties
- Fourteen counted sources are field studies drawn largely from the same AIDev pull-request data (2025), so they are not independent samples; as for other coding-agent entries, each study counts once.
- Field studies identify Cursor pull requests by cursor/ branch names, which mainly capture background or cloud agents, not agent mode inside the editor.
- Results depend heavily on the model chosen inside Cursor; benchmark figures describe agent and model together.
- Cursor releases change often (about v1.0 to v3.x during 2025-2026); most field studies state no version.
- Two competitor-authored comparisons and one whole-product adoption study are listed but not counted.
- Citation check incomplete — recheck later (Semantic Scholar rate-limited and the arXiv API unavailable; OpenAlex used; several MSR 2026 papers not screened).
Sources
Independent performance sources (counted)
- Comparing AI Coding Agents (Trieste, KCL, UCL; MSR 2026, arXiv 2602.08915): 569 Cursor pull requests accepted at 74.5% overall and 74.4% in the common May-July 2025 window, second of five (Codex 79.9%); 80.4% on fix tasks and 77.8% on test tasks (few samples). AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Where Do AI Coding Agents Fail? (Drexel, Missouri S&T; MSR 2026): Cursor pull requests merged at 65.22% (1,005 of 1,541), second of five (Codex 82.59%); lowest on build (0.57) and performance (0.46) tasks. AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Why Are AI Agent-Involved Pull Requests (Fix-Related) Remain Unmerged? (Saskatchewan; MSR 2026, arXiv 2602.00164): fix-related Cursor pull requests merged at 68.4% (281 of 411; Codex 81.6%, Copilot 42.4%). AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- When AI Agents Touch CI/CD Configurations (Trent; MSR 2026, arXiv 2601.17413): Cursor pull requests that changed CI/CD files merged 4.03 points more often than its other pull requests (p = 0.029); build success 79.10-83.13%. AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- A Task-Level Evaluation of AI Agents in Open-Source Projects (Idaho State; MSR 2026): Cursor average acceptance 0.67 across task types (Codex 0.83, Claude Code 0.66, Copilot 0.45); higher share of good commit messages (0.63). AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Reliability of AI Bots Footprints in GitHub Actions CI/CD Workflows (MSR 2026, arXiv 2604.18334): workflow runs on Cursor pull requests succeeded 73.29% (high-level languages) and 65.07% (low-level), below Copilot and Codex (about 93-94%). AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- How do Agents Refactor (Alberta; MSR 2026, arXiv 2601.20160): Cursor made the fewest refactorings in Java pull requests (31) and was the only agent with a statistically significant increase in code smells. Small sample. AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Security in the Age of AI Teammates (Notre Dame; Information and Software Technology 2026, arXiv 2601.00477): security-related Cursor pull requests merged at 76.47%, second of five (Codex 86.59%, Copilot 49.60%). AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Red-Teaming Coding Agents from a Tool-Invocation Perspective (HKUST, Fudan; ISSTA 2026, arXiv 2509.05755): system-prompt leak similarity 0.949 on Cursor; two-channel tool hijacking reached remote code execution at 0.8-1.0 on older releases and at most 0.3 on Cursor v3.3.30 with newer models. Security test of agent mode — accessed 2026-10-19
- SWE-Bench Mobile (Toronto, Xiaohongshu and others; KDD 2026, arXiv 2602.09540): 50 iOS tasks; Cursor with Opus 4.5 or Sonnet 4.5 solved 12%, tied highest of 22 configurations (Cursor with GPT 5.1: 2%); the same model scored 2% in OpenCode. Benchmark — accessed 2026-10-19
- The Rise of AI Teammates in SE 3.0 (Queen's University; AIDev dataset paper; preprint): Cursor pull requests accepted at 51.4% (Codex 65.3%, Copilot 38.2%, human 76.8%). Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Why Agentic-PRs Get Rejected (Kyushu, Waterloo; preprint): Cursor acceptance 74.6% of 1,347 pull requests (Codex 85.8%, Claude Code 71.3%, human 82.6%). AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- How Do AI Coding Agents Contribute to Software Development? (Polytechnique Montreal; preprint Jul 2026): estimated merge probability 63.9% for Cursor, third of five (Claude Code 84.3%, Codex 73.5%, Devin 43.0%). AIDev repositories plus data to Nov 2025. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Merged, Not Measured (preprint Sep 2026): performance-fix pull requests accepted at 42% for Cursor (Codex, Claude Code, Jules 73%; Copilot 50%; Devin 30%). AIDev v4. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Not All Agents Are Equal (Texas Tech; preprint Sep 2026): Cursor pull requests had the lowest rate of any security smell (1.6%) and of hard-coded credentials (0.5%) among five agents and humans. AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- Trust but Verify? (UTSA; preprint Jul 2026): about 40.6% of Cursor pull requests carried a security smell (corpus average 38.9%; Copilot 45.5%, Codex 34.9%); value read from a figure. AIDev data. Field study — accessed 2026-10-19
- IssueTrojanBench (Concordia; preprint Jul 2026): malicious issue requests succeeded against Cursor in 66.5% of cases on average (Sonnet 4.6 41.1%, GPT-5.4 73.6%, GPT-5.3 Codex 84.8%); Codex Desktop 79.2%, Claude Code 41.1%. Security test — accessed 2026-10-19
- Your Harness is Not Secure / AdvCLI (Georgia, Johns Hopkins and others, one Apple author; preprint): on attack-technique tasks Cursor IDE completed 39.19% of misuse requests and Cursor CLI 62.16% (86.49% went beyond refusal); MCP penetration tools raised success further. Security test — accessed 2026-10-19
- AgentKernelArena (AMD; preprint May 2026): 196 GPU kernel tasks; Cursor Agent with Opus 4.7 ranked first on Triton-to-Triton (2.13x mean speedup); compilation fell to 69.4% with GPT-5.4 on PyTorch-to-HIP. Benchmark — accessed 2026-10-19
Other sources (not counted)
- All Smoke, No Alarm (Kennesaw State and others; IEEE AITest 2026): Claude Code and Devin wrote tests with stronger oracle signals than Copilot, Cursor and Codex. Descriptive analysis — accessed 2026-10-19
- Habituation at the Gate (preprint Jun 2026): reviewer approval trends; Cursor samples (10-18) too small, as the authors note. Descriptive — accessed 2026-10-19
- Who Finishes the Job? (Deakin; Empirical Software Engineering submission): only 8 follow-up fix pairs for Cursor (87.5% by Cursor itself); the authors do not compare cohorts on these rates. Sample too small — accessed 2026-10-19
- Why Are Agentic Pull Requests Merged or Rejected? (Osaka, Ritsumeikan; preprint): Cursor pull requests were often merged with minimal interaction. Descriptive — accessed 2026-10-19
- Collaborator or Assistant? (Toronto; preprint): Cursor pull requests routed through review 51.3% of the time. Workflow description, not an outcome measure — accessed 2026-10-19
- Beyond Simpson's Paradox (preprint Jun 2026): co-authorship and merge rates; Cursor +2.1 points within repositories. Confounder analysis, not an agent outcome measure — accessed 2026-10-19
- Insights into Security-Related AI-Generated Pull Requests (Idaho State; preprint): weakness types by pull-request outcome; Cursor pull requests with detected issues were more often left open. Descriptive — accessed 2026-10-19
- Understanding the Rejection of Fixes Generated by Agentic Pull Requests (ETS; MSR 2026): rejection reasons pooled across four agents. Not agent-specific — accessed 2026-10-19
- AI Agent Pull Requests on GitHub: Merge Conflict Rates (preprint): Cursor co-activity 69.8%; authors attribute differences to deployment. Descriptive — accessed 2026-10-19
- AI IDEs or Autonomous Agents? (Carnegie Mellon; preprint): causal study of agent adoption pooled across agents. Not Cursor-specific — accessed 2026-10-19
- Speed at the Cost of Quality (Carnegie Mellon; MSR 2026, arXiv 2511.04427): projects adopting Cursor (adoptions Aug 2024-Mar 2025) saw transient velocity gains and lasting increases in static-analysis warnings (+30%) and complexity (+41%). Whole-product adoption study, mostly before agent mode became the default; Google research awards disclosed. Not counted under D5 — accessed 2026-10-19
- Are AI-assisted Development Tools Immune to Prompt Injection? (NYIT; preprint Mar 2026): MCP tool-poisoning tests on seven clients; all four attacks succeeded on Cursor 1.6.45, rated the most exposed. Qualitative rating, classified as other as for Claude Code — accessed 2026-10-19
- HarnessSecurity-Bench (Sun Yat-sen and others; preprint Oct 2026): Cursor rated only in a documentation review of security mechanisms; attacks were run on six other harnesses — accessed 2026-10-19
- Agentic Much? Adoption of Coding Agents on GitHub (ACM TOSEM 2026): adoption measurement including Cursor. Descriptive — accessed 2026-10-19
- 28 CVEs published 2025-2026 concern Cursor agent features (MCP configuration, auto-run allowlist, sensitive-file protection, terminal sandbox, CLI and cloud agent); CVSS 4.4-9.8, four at 9.6 or above; all published through Cursor's own GitHub advisories with fixed versions (for example CVE-2025-54135 and CVE-2025-54136, fixed in 1.3.9 and 1.3; CVE-2026-22708, fixed in 2.3; CVE-2026-50548 and CVE-2026-50549, fixed in 3.0; CVE-2026-61613, cloud agent browser, fixed 31 Mar 2026). Two 2024 CVEs (macOS permissions, Cmd-K) are outside this entry — accessed 2026-10-19
- Cursor's GitHub security advisories: 33 listed (2024-09 to 2026-07), including two rated critical in June 2026 (desktop sandbox escapes); a few concern billing or usage APIs rather than the agent — accessed 2026-10-19
- PocketOS (Apr 2026): founder reported that a Cursor agent running Claude Opus 4.6 deleted a production database volume through a cloud provider API using an unrelated token; the provider later restored the data. Single self-reported incident — accessed 2026-10-19
Not counted
- RedCodeAgent (Chicago, UIUC, Microsoft Research and others; preprint 2025): Cursor Composer with the cursor-small model showed higher attack success and lower refusal than research agents. Earlier Composer version, agent mode not confirmed — accessed 2026-10-19
- Setup Complete, Now You Are Compromised (Microsoft-affiliated authors; preprint Jul 2026): Cursor CLI installed a look-alike package in 28 of 30 runs; GitHub Copilot CLI is in the comparison and is shown handling some attacks better. Not counted (competitor-authored comparison) — accessed 2026-10-19
- RepoGenesis (Microsoft and others; preprint): Cursor deployability 68.18% (Python) and 75.00% (Java); GitHub Copilot is in the comparison and leads on Python. Not counted (competitor-authored comparison) — accessed 2026-10-19
- IDE-Bench (preprint): tests models in a harness modelled on Cursor-like IDEs, not Cursor itself — accessed 2026-10-19
- Anysphere blog posts, documentation, CursorBench and the Composer 2 Technical Report (arXiv 2603.24477); vendor, not counted. The 4 July 2025 post 'Clarifying our pricing' apologised for the June 2025 pricing change and offered refunds for unexpected charges — accessed 2026-10-19
- Studies of Tab completion, inline edits (Cmd-K), chat-only use and Bugbot code review (out of scope).
Decision record: 0083.