Agent Reputation & TrustClearinghouse

OpenHands (open-source)

Category
Coding agent
Type
Open-source coding-agent platform and Agent SDK (MIT licence, enterprise directory excepted), developed by All Hands AI; formerly OpenDevin
Source
Project repository
Last reviewed
2026-10-17 (what this means)

Summary

OpenHands is an open-source coding agent that edits files, runs shell commands and browses the web inside a sandbox. It is run with a language model chosen by the user. Twelve independent studies that ran it were found (seven peer-reviewed). Results depend heavily on the model and task. They range from about 3% on .NET performance bugs and 4.4% medal rate on MLE-bench (GPT-4o, 2024) to 39.1% on long-horizon upgrade tasks, 46.12 on BeyondSWE and 48.15% on GitTaskBench with the strongest models. In a 2026 study of out-of-scope actions on routine tasks, OpenHands had the lowest rate of the frameworks tested (0.2-4.5%). A separate benchmark measured an average boundary-violation rate of 18.19%. In a security benchmark, 8.1-11.8% of its solutions were both functional and secure. Two CVEs have been published, one fixed in 1.5.0. A security researcher has published prompt-injection demonstrations, including token exfiltration and remote code execution. Informational only; not a guarantee, endorsement, or certification.

Overall score: 61 · Evidence grade: A · Independent sources: 12 performance (7 peer-reviewed), 6 other

Evidence grade describes the amount and type of evidence, not the agent's quality.

Factor breakdown

Factor breakdown
FactorWeightScoreNote
Completion rate30%50MLE-bench (GPT-4o, 2024): 4.4% ± 1.4 any-medal rate, below AIDE; runs often ended early. ScienceAgentBench (CodeActAgent v1.9): Claude 3.5 Sonnet solved 21.6% with OpenHands vs 32.4% with plain self-debug at 17× the cost. GitTaskBench (OpenHands 0.33.0): best success 48.15% with Claude 3.7. PerfBench (GPT-4.1): about 3% on 81 .NET performance bugs. RoadmapBench: 5.2-39.1% across 13 models. BeyondSWE: best 46.12 average score (DeepSeek-V4-Pro). Dialogue SWE-Bench: 32.9% average resolve rate. PBT-Bench (SDK v1.11.5, July 2026): up to 83.4% bug recall (Sonnet 4.6). SusVibes (ICML 2026): 19.9-53.2% of security-sensitive feature tasks passed functional tests across four models (best Claude 4 Sonnet).
Disputes20%55CVE-2026-33718 (command injection in the git diff handler, 1.5.0 up to the fix; CVSS 3.1 7.6 per GitHub, 9.9 per NVD; fixed in 1.5.0 per the advisory). CVE-2026-19022 (command injection in resolver/send_pull_request.py, up to 0.62.0; CVSS 3.1 6.3 per VulDB; NVD Deferred; VulDB notes the vendor deleted the original issue report and the file was removed in 1.7.0). Published prompt-injection demonstrations (Embrace The Red, August 2025): GITHUB_TOKEN exfiltration via rendered images and remote code execution. The developer responded publicly with mitigation guidance. No legal or regulatory action found.
Adherence to limits25%55Overeager Coding Agents (Griffith University et al., preprint May 2026; OpenHands 0.59.1): out-of-scope actions on benign tasks 0.2-4.5%, the lowest of four frameworks (Claude Code up to 27.7% with the same model). SWE-MISBEHAVIOR (National University of Singapore et al., preprint Oct 2026): average boundary-violation rate 18.19% for OpenHands, 12.31% with the authors' mitigation. MLE-bench: agents ignored compute and time limits and overloaded machines. Confirmation mode and a security analyzer are available; the developer says model refusal is a soft, not hard, control. SusVibes (ICML 2026): 8.1-11.8% of OpenHands' solutions were both functional and secure, and 77.8% of its functionally correct solutions with Claude 4 Sonnet had a vulnerability; across models, 20.1% of its correct solutions were secure, second of three frameworks tested (SWE-agent 23.3%, Claude Code 17.4%).
Evidence quality25%85Twelve independent sources, seven peer-reviewed (ICLR 2025 ×2, AAAI 2026, an ICSE 2026 workshop, NeurIPS 2026, ICML 2026, ISSTA 2026). Recent tests state versions (SDK v1.11.5, July 2026; OpenHands 0.59.1). Most are benchmark papers using OpenHands as a common scaffold; several propose competing agents (disclosed).

0.30 × 50 + 0.20 × 55 + 0.25 × 55 + 0.25 × 85 = 61.00, rounded to 61 (rounding rule).

Scope

The open-source OpenHands agent (CodeAct agent, later the OpenHands Agent SDK) run with a language model chosen by the user, from the OpenDevin releases of 2024 through OpenHands 1.27.1 (12 October 2026). The hosted OpenHands Cloud service and the enterprise directory are not covered. OpenDevin, OpenHands and the OpenHands Agent SDK are treated as one continuous product. Results depend heavily on the language model and task, so they are reported as ranges by model.

How sources were counted

Most counted studies are benchmark papers that run language models inside OpenHands. Because OpenHands itself is the agent being run, these count as tests of OpenHands; the results reflect the model and OpenHands together. A study with an All Hands AI co-author (OpenAgentSafety) is excluded as developer-affiliated. Multi-SWE-bench tested a substantially modified fork (MopenHands) and is listed as context only. Leaderboard entries submitted by the developer are not counted.

Disclosures for counted sources

No counted study has authors from All Hands AI. PerfBench is by Microsoft, which makes a competing coding agent. SWE-MISBEHAVIOR includes authors from Salesforce AI Research. BeyondSWE, Dialogue SWE-Bench and SWE-MISBEHAVIOR each propose a competing method and compare it against OpenHands. SusVibes acknowledges compute from Modal and Gemini API credits from Google (whose models it tests), and was partly supported by HydroX AI, an author affiliation. Several authors are at Carnegie Mellon, where OpenHands co-founder Graham Neubig is faculty; no SusVibes author is an OpenHands paper author or All Hands AI founder. The benchmark's task pipeline uses SWE-agent, a competing framework.

Security

OpenHands runs commands written by the model, inside a sandbox by default. CVSS scores are as assigned by the named scorer; status is as listed by NVD on 17 October 2026.

A security researcher published prompt-injection demonstrations in August 2025: one leaked an access token, and one ran malware. The developer has published mitigation guidance (sandboxing, confirmation mode, a security analyzer); this is the developer's own statement. No legal or regulatory action was found.

Uncertainties

Sources

Independent performance sources (counted)

Other sources (not counted)

Not counted

Decision records: 0037; 0049 (SusVibes); 0052 (citation backfill).